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Introduction  
Having reviewed 238 cases of developmental prosopagnosia (DP) that met their criteria, 
Geskin and Behrmann (2017) found that only ~20% exhibit normal object recognition. This 
figure likely underestimates the proportion of individuals with a selective face perception 
deficit (‘pure cases’) as many DPs exhibiting accurate object recognition were excluded from 
the authors’ primary analysis because response time data were unavailable. Nevertheless, it is 
clear that object recognition problems frequently co-occur with DP. What does this mean? 
Geskin and Behrmann argue that this indicates that DP is caused by a domain-general 
cognitive-perceptual deficit. We suggest an alternative interpretation. According to the 
independent disorders hypothesis, forms of developmental agnosia affecting faces (DP), 
objects (developmental object agnosia; DOA), and bodies (developmental body agnosia; 
DBA) are best characterised as independent neurodevelopmental conditions that co-occur; 
that is to say, the incidence of DOA and DBA is higher in DP than in the wider population. 
We argue that this co-occurrence reflects common genetic or environmental risk factors. 
 
The independent disorders hypothesis 
Co-occurrence is a common feature of many neurodevelopmental conditions. For example, 
numerous conditions co-occur with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) including attention 
deficit and hyperactivity disorder (Leitner, 2014), developmental coordination disorder 
(Dziuk et al., 2007), developmental alexithymia (Bird & Cook, 2013), specific language 
impairment (Conti-Ramsden, Simkin, & Botting, 2006), dyslexia (Jones et al., 2009) and 
synesthesia (Baron-Cohen et al., 2013). While each of these conditions is an independent 
construct – each can occur in the absence of other disorders – they occur with a greater 
incidence in ASD than in the wider population. While co-occurrence is regarded as the ‘norm 
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rather than the exception’ in psychiatry, this feature of neurodevelopmental conditions is 
often overlooked by vision researchers.  
 
Some co-occurrence likely reflects the fact that development is an inherently recursive 
process; atypicality in one area may have knock-on developmental consequences in other 
areas. However, genetic or environmental factors that predispose an individual to one 
condition, also appear to increase their risk of developing others (Bishop & Rutter, 2008; 
Gilger & Kaplan, 2001; Kaplan, Dewey, Crawford, & Wilson, 2001). One possibility is that a 
predisposition to atypical neural development – including reduced white matter integrity 
(Fields, 2008) and aberrant neuronal migration (Ramus, 2004) – leaves individuals vulnerable 
to multiple neurodevelopmental conditions. In line with this possibility, we speculate that i) 
individuals do not inherit DP per se, but rather a susceptibility to aberrant structural 
development of occipito-temporal cortex (also see Susilo & Duchaine, 2013); and ii) this 
predisposition represents a common risk factor for DP, DBA, and DOA.  
 
Many DPs, for example, exhibit reduced integrity of the inferior longitudinal fasciculus; a 
white matter tract connecting occipital and temporal cortices. Sometimes, these structural 
differences are highly localised (Song et al., 2015). In other cases, widespread structural 
differences are seen throughout occipito-temporal cortex (Thomas et al., 2009). A DP’s white 
matter profile may not only determine the type of face perception deficits they exhibit, but 
also whether or not they experience perceptual deficits for non-face stimuli (e.g., Gomez et 
al., 2015). Where poor tract integrity impairs information exchange within body and object 
processing networks, individuals may experience deficits of body and object perception, 
respectively. Consistent with previous demonstrations of functional dissociation (Moscovitch, 
Winocur, & Behrmann, 1997; Pitcher, Charles, Devlin, Walsh, & Duchaine, 2009), the 
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independent disorders hypothesis supposes that aberrant structural development can, in 
principle, selectively impair the perception of faces, bodies, or objects. Under this view, 
forms of developmental agnosia affecting faces, bodies, and objects are therefore 
characterized as independent conditions.  
 
The evidence 
Pure cases. If face and object recognition deficits co-occur because a common domain-
general process (e.g., configural processing) is impaired, pure cases of DP, DBA, or DOA 
should not exist. In contrast, the independent disorders hypothesis explicitly predicts pure 
cases of DP, DBA, and DOA. Consistent with the latter, the analysis of Geskin and 
Behrmann confirms the existence of pure cases of DP. Similarly, case studies have described 
individuals with DOA in the absence of co-occurring face recognition difficulties (Germine, 
Cashdollar, Düzel, & Duchaine, 2011). Relative to DP, we acknowledge that fewer cases of 
pure DOA and DBA have been described. It is possible that the organisation of occipito-
temporal cortex makes cases of pure DOA and DBA less likely. Alternatively, individuals 
with pure forms of DOA and/or DBA may be less likely to approach researchers given that 
body and object recognition difficulties are likely to be less socially debilitating than face 
recognition deficits. Crucially, however, the relative infrequency of pure cases (of DP, DOA 
or DBA) compared to instances of co-occurrence in no way undermines the independent 
disorders hypothesis; one only requires a handful of individuals, tested thoroughly, to 
demonstrate the dissociability of these conditions. 
 
Covariation of deficits. The domain-general account offered by Geskin and Behrmann 
predicts that the extent of an observer’s deficit in one category ought to relate closely to their 
relative performance in other categories. However, existing results argue against this view. 
For example, Zhao and colleagues (2016) found a non-significant correlation between face 
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and object (flowers, birds, and cars) discrimination accuracy in a sample of 64 DPs (see also  
Biotti & Cook, 2016). Similarly, we recently observed little or no correlation between ability 
to discriminate cars and bodies, assessed using closely matched tasks, in a sample of 20 DPs 
(Biotti, Gray, & Cook, 2017). Results such as these argue against the view that face and non-
face deficits arise from a single domain-general impairment. Instead, idiosyncratic patterns of 
face, body, and object recognition ability support the independent disorders hypothesis. These 
findings further highlight the value of testing DPs on a wide range of object recognition tasks. 
The domain-general hypothesis predicts that observers with DP should have difficulties 
recognising a wide range of non-face objects (e.g., impaired configural processing should 
lead to poor perception of any object class that requires configural processing). Selective 
impairment in one or two object categories is therefore weak evidence for a domain-general 
perceptual deficit.   
 
Familial heterogeneity. Where individuals inherit susceptibility to aberrant structural 
development, this predisposition may manifest idiosyncratically. The independent disorders 
hypothesis therefore allows that familial cases of DP may present with very different 
cognitive-perceptual profiles. For example, shared susceptibility might leave one family 
member with a highly selective case of apperceptive prosopagnosia, and another with an 
associative prosopagnosia with co-occurring DOA and DBA. Early results provide some 
support for this possibility. For example, having tested seven members of a single family who 
all reported lifelong face recognition difficulties, Schmalzl and colleagues (2008) found that 
the cases differed widely in terms of their face processing difficulties and the specificity of 
their deficits. With this finding in mind, we speculate that family members of DPs may 
sometimes show signs of DOA and/or DBA, even where they exhibit typical face 
recognition.  
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Co-occurrence with autism. The independent disorders hypothesis predicts that individuals 
predisposed to DP should be more likely to develop other neurodevelopmental conditions, 
such as ASD, and vice versa. It is beyond doubt that DP and ASD are independent 
conditions; for example, it is known that DP can occur in the absence of wider socio-
cognitive difficulties (Duchaine, Murray, Turner, White, & Garrido, 2009). Nevertheless, 
face recognition difficulties are more common in ASD than in the general population (e.g., 
Hedley, Brewer, & Young, 2011). Where observed, it may be fruitful to view these face 
recognition deficits as co-occurring DP. Of particular interest, there appears to be a huge 
range of face recognition abilities in the ASD population; whereas some individuals 
experience severe lifelong face recognition problems that closely resemble DP (Kracke, 
1995), many others exhibit entirely typical face perception (Hedley et al., 2011). While this 
pattern challenges the view that deficits in this domain are a core feature of ASD per se, it is 
precisely what one might expect if a subset of the ASD population experience co-occurring 
DP.  
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